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1) INTRODUCTION: THE NEED OF ACADEMY-INDUSTRY RELATIONS 
 
We are living in a new economy driven by knowledge. According to Kendrick (1994) 
the stock of  gross real capital in the US from 1929 to 1990  shows the increase of 
intangible over tangible capital: 6.075 billion dollars of tangible capital in 1929 and 
28.525 in 1990 vs. 3.251 billion dollars of intangible capital in 1929 and 32.819 in 
1990. Tangible capital comprises facilities, machineries, stocks and natural resources. 
Intangible capital comprises education, R&D and services. The importance of 
knowledge expressed by R&D and innovation comes also from other data. According 
to McCloskey (1985) the increase of annual productivity in the UK between 1780 and 
1860 was of 1,33%. Only 0,14% derives from a greater capital intensity, while the 
remaining 1,19% was generated by innovations in processes and products. Similar 
data come from Solow (1971) regarding the US from 1909 to 1949: only a 12,5% 
increase in productivity was caused by a greater capital intensity while the remaining 
87,5% derived from process and product innovations. 
The growing importance of R&D&I was already present during the first industrial 
revolution in UK. The knowledge useful for innovation was embodied in the mind 
and body of the inventors. They worked alone or in small groups detached from 
universities. The knowledge they employed was mainly procedural, know-how that 
had the feature of being tacit and not transferable in any linguistic format 
(descriptions, blue prints, diagrams, and patents). The inventions gave rise to 
innovations subjects to the “law of diminishing returns” (Mokyr,  2002a; 2002b), 
because the lack of a scientific base didn’t allow the enlargement of the area of 
application of innovation. Many factors,  in particular the growing selective pressures 
of  market competition and the new financial opportunities arising from  the 
development of the joint-stock companies and share markets,  changed the way of 
pursuing innovation. In particular in the US, after the Sherman Antitrust Act  of 1890  
forbidding the trust agreements among firms,  followed by the decision of Supreme 
Court against horizontal fusions among firms and the new laws aimed at 
strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in industrial patents, there was a growing 
attention to the factors that might increase the rate of  radical innovation, first of all 
science (Rosenberg & Mowery, 1998).   Many industrialists, like Kodak and Du Pont, 
began to establish strong links with  academic labs. Edison Menlo Park laboratory 
was the model of science applied to technology. A similar phenomenon had happened 
some time before in Germany with the organic chemistry revolution. 
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The convergence of university and industry was not an unilateral phenomenon caused 
by industrial striving to become more competitive. Also universities   had gradually 
changed their attitude towards industry. While the academic world at the beginning of 
the century opened itself towards applied research in order to pursue social and 
political needs (mainly in agriculture, health, and geology) -  change labelled as the 
First Academic Revolution  - around the middle of the century another shift 
happened. The universities, in particular the American ones, following the MIT-
Stanford model began to be active partners in companies, in order to earn industrial 
contracts, to sell academic patents, to establish spin-off companies, etc.. This radical 
shift in respect to the pure XIX century academic functions of teaching and basic 
research, seems to characterize the Second Academic Revolution (Etzkowitz, 1998). 
This metamorphosis of the university was caused by many factors, but mainly by the 
shortcomings of public funds (because of the fiscal crisis of the state) and by a new 
demand  from government and society that universities contribute to  local and 
national economic growth and welfare. 
 The convergence of university and industry driven by the government is also called 
the Triple Helix (Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1996)  and characterizes the current 
innovation policy and the academic transformation in most first world and emergent 
countries. Most of the models of local industrial development – cluster, regional 
innovation system, hub, milieu, tecnopoli, etc.. -  are centred on the strong links and 
collaboration between university and industry.       
The collaboration initially focused on the consultancy of academics to the company 
regarding upgrading  the scientific literature or advices on specific technical 
problems. But soon, particularly in the States and in some certain field such as ICT 
and life sciences, the collaboration spread to many different aspects of technological 
innovation. In particular  focus was placed on the transfer of  knowledge, represented 
mainly by patents or patent applications to the company.  But as  shown by the results 
of a research conducted at MIT the importance of patent transfer seems greatly over 
estimated (Agarwal and Henderson, 2002; Lester, 2005). Infact MIT faculty members 
of Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, all of 
them patent holders,  patenting and licensing  activity was perceived to be responsible 
for less than 7% of the knowledge transfer out of university. Faculty consulting 
(26%), publications (18%), and recruiting of students (17%) were all ranked 
significantly higher (Agarwal and Henderson, 2002).    
In any case the pursuit of  academy-industry relations was and is not an easy task, 
particularly in some countries. According to many surveys the academy-industry 
relations remain difficult. The 2008 executive opinion survey of IMD   on knowledge 
transfer between university and industry shows an assessment that doesn’t overcome 
6.9 (in an index from 0 to 10) with most of country from continental Europe at the 
bottom of ranking (see the enclosure). A little better, but similar  data are about the 
public and private sector ventures  (see the enclosure). OECD in its paper on open 
innovation (2008) remarks the difficulty of  collaboration in innovation activities 
between companies and universities or  public research organization. The preference 
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of companies direct themselves towards suppliers and customers (see the enclosure). 
The data coming from the 4th Community Innovation Survey (CIS-4) are confirmed 
by EPO applications with multiple applicants (1980-2003) that show that the co-
assignments beween companies and public research institutions (universities and 
public research organizations) are less important than the business co-application (see 
the enclosure).   
 
There are some data coming from empirical studies that  tried to explain the causes of 
this difficulty in academy-industry relations. Some studies try to deepen the cultural 
distances between academicians and entrepreneurs (Nooteboom, et al., 2007). In one 
of them (Siegel et al., 1999) it was underlined the role of different norms, standards 
and values as a barrier to effective UITT (University Industry Technology Transfer). 
Lack of understanding was the main barrier for UITT. The cultural distance was 
evident from the primary motives for university scientists – recognition within 
scientific community – compared to those of entrepreneurs – financial gain. The 
organizational culture of universities values creativity, innovation and, mainly, 
advancement of knowledge. On the contrary the organizational culture of companies 
rewards timeliness, speed, and flexibility (Siegel, et al., 1999).     
 
The main features of the studies trying to single out the obstacles to technology 
transfer are two: 1) They give a great emphasis to  wrong structure of economic 
incentives as the main cause of distance between universities and companies; 2) They 
try to single out social and cultural differences without understanding and deepening 
which are their real effect in hindering the academy-industry collaboration. The first 
position is a typical economic reductionist thesis that fails to understand  complex 
nature of human motivations to act. Is a thesis that can be applied to econs, that is 
homo oeconomicus, and not to humans (Thaler and Sustein, 2008). It is a well 
established empirical knowledge that, ceteris paribus, the economic incentives and 
the context of choice humans  behave very differently according their history, their 
personality traits, their emotional and knowledge structure, their set of values and so 
on. When the context of choice is variable, as in the real world case of university-
industry relations,  complexity is greater. For example  same economic incentives 
have a different impact according to the different frames and communication means 
that trasmit them. In any case, even if we can suppose that  economic incentives may 
push academic and industrial scientists to interact, that doesn’t mean that dialogue 
doesn’t risk to be as in the Theatre of Absurd of Samuel Beckett. The interaction 
doesn’t succeed to become a fruitful collaboration and problem solving because 
background knowledge, epistemological interests and ways of reasoning and decision 
making are  incompatible  and in some cases incommensurable each other. Economic 
incentives are important but are one of  many variables to consider. The second thesis 
is more realistic, but it has the defect not to regard humans as emotional cognitive 
agent, but only as social actors. Knowledge of social and cultural differences  
between academic and industrial context is important. But they represent a true 
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explanation of obstacles to  university-industry interaction and knowledge transfer if 
we single out how these values can influence the internal mechanisms of 
collaboration and  working of group.  In other words we should single out how these 
values and norms influence  linguistic coordination,  psychology of group, and  
thinking, reasoning and decision making processes. At the level of internal 
mechanisms of collaboration and cognitive coordination it is possible to single out 
and understand  real obstacles to  knowledge transfer.     
 
The obstacles will be analyzed according two dimensions: that of  knowledge transfer 
through the licensing of a patent or of a technology and that of the knowledge transfer 
through the collaboration between academic and industrial researchers aimed at 
developing a commercial product. The first dimension will be analyzed very briefly. 
It will focus on the problem of tacit knowledge that has been analyzed in previous 
papers (Pozzali and Viale, 2007; Balconi, Pozzali and Viale, 2008; Viale and Pozzali, 
2008). The present paper will deepen the second dimension of the obstacles to 




2) OBSTACLES TO KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER (1): TACIT KNOWLEDGE  
 
 
2.1 In theory the relations between universities and business might be simple. The 
company asks for a technological solution and the university labs prepare it and sell 
or send the patent to the company. 
In reality there are many institutional, social and legal features that hamper this 
collaboration. Every national and  local dimension presents its own features. 
Obstacles can be negative social incentives inside the university. For example the 
negative assessment of the collaboration with the business can hinder one’s academic 
career. The interest in knowledge can be very different: the university is interested 
only for curiosity driven research, whereas business is only interested in research for 
direct commercial aims. The legal constraints of  academic  employment can be 
strong disincentives to the collaboration with a corporate lab. Sometimes the law can 
also  forbid an  academic consultancy. There can be spatial and social distances 
between the two worlds. University buildings  are generally far from  industrial areas 
and the academic community that is inside this social network is often completely 
detached from that of entrepreneurs and of the business community.   
 These kinds of obstacles are still widespread and  present in many situations in 
continental Europe as they are in  emerging and third world countries. And some 
governments are undertaking initiatives to neutralize them. In some cases they have 
been successful, but our question is: if these obstacles are neutralized and   
knowledge transfer and  collaboration remains still difficult, what might be the other 




The first answer concerns the fact that the transfer through some form of explicit 
representation of knowledge (e.g. patent, publication, report, diagram, flow chart, 
etc..)  is, most of the times, incomplete because of the presence of some tacit aspects 
of knowledge. 
 
The concept of “tacit knowledge”, introduced in modern epistemological literature 
through the seminal work of the scientist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi 
(1958; 1967), has experienced over the years an ever widening application in a 
growing number of disparate disciplines, that range from psychology to mathematics, 
from econometrics to religious thought, from aesthetics to evolutive economy 
As could be expected, with the expansion of the use of the term, critical voices have 
also multiplied, whose objections are based particularly on two aspects: 
 
On one hand, the concept of tacit knowledge is said to have been used in an 
indiscriminate manner in too heterogeneous a series of contexts, without concerns for 
coming to some conceptual clarification of the meaning to be attributed to the 
concept itself. As a result, the term “tacit knowledge” has become less precise and 
more vague: it can be used in many different instances, but in fact  lacks any effective 
explicatory value (Cowan, David and Foray, 2000, 213). 
On the other hand, the ever greater capillary diffusion of information and 
telecommunication technologies should increase the capacity to codify  information 
and therefore to strongly limit the domain of “tacit knowledge”. According to this 
viewpoint, in principle, all knowledge to some degree can be codified: it is only the 
different cost/benefit structures associated with the codification operation that 
determine if the given knowledge remains tacit and unexpressed (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994, 502; on the same subject, see also Foray and Cowan, 1997; Foray and 
Steinmueller, 2003). 
As it is described in Balconi et al. (2008) the thesis about  strong effect of computer 
and telecommunications advances on  reduced degree of tacitness is groundless. The 
main flaw of this thesis is  reduction of tacitness only to know-how. On the contrary 
tacitness can be present in other types of knowledge that play an important function 
in technology  transfer and that can’t be overcome by ICT advances.   
Tacit knowledge can be classified in the following three categories (Pozzali and 
Viale, 2007): 
 
Tacit knowledge as competence(C): this class includes all the forms of physical 
abilities and skills that refer to the capacity of a subject to know how to perform 
certain activities without being able to describe the knowledge he used to do the task. 
This kind of tacit knowledge operates in particular in physical-like abilities such as 
swimming or riding a bicycle: in all these skilful performances, the activity is carried 
out by following a set of rules that are not explicitly known by the person following 
them. The same holds also for more complicated and less common abilities, that are 
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at the base of the development of craftsmanship (for example, the ability to make a 
violin) and of large technological innovations (such as nuclear weapons, cfr. 
MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995, or aircrafts, cfr. Vincenti, 1990).  
Tacit knowledge in the form of competence is at the base of the  concept of “know-
how” (Ryle, 1949/1984) and of procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1983). This 
knowledge type also has an important role in the development of scientific and 
technological innovations, as has been pointed to in numerous works in the sociology 
of science and in the history of technology (Cambrosio and Keating, 1988; Vincenti, 
1990; Collins, 1992, 2001; Jordan and Lynch, 1992; Mackenzie and Spinardi, 1995; 
Pinch, Collins and Carbone, 1996). In the economic field, the work of Nelson and 
Winter (1982) is the classic reference for the analysis of the importance of tacit skills 
in evolutionary economics and in the organizational capabilities approach to the 
theory of the firm. 
 
Tacit knowledge as background knowledge (BK): in this class we find all those forms 
of interiorised regulations, of codes of conduct, of values and widespread knowledge 
that a determined subject knows from his direct experience. This knowledge cannot 
be articulated or formalised because of its extremely dispersed nature, which makes it 
difficult to access to it by conscious awareness. This type of tacit knowledge has 
more than one affinity with the notion of background, introduced by Searle in an 
attempt to find a solution to the problem of retrieving a stable foundation for the 
process of  the interpretation of rules and of representations (Searle, 1992; 1995). 
Background is defined as that set of biological and cultural capacities, of 
assumptions, of presuppositions and of pre-theoretic convictions that are the 
preconditions of any form of theoretical knowledge.  
 
Tacit knowledge as implicit cognitive rules(ICRs): As a matter of fact, the possibility 
of considering tacit knowledge as also  having  a cognitive dimension was for many 
years substantially ruled out in epistemology and in cognitive sciences. The only way 
of considering tacit knowledge was limited to admitting that it could have a role in 
skill-like abilities.  In the last few years this kind of veto toward a form of “tacit 
cognition” is beginning to vacillate, thanks in particular to the empirical and theoretic 
evidences coming from cognitive psychology and from the neurosciences. The first 
and perhaps the most significant example of a form of tacit knowledge  is linguistic 
knowledge (Chomsky, 1986, 263-273). This form of knowledge does not represent, 
in a strict sense, a form of skill, but must be considered as an actual cognitive system, 
defined in terms of mental states and structures that cannot be articulated in words 
nor described in a complete formal language. Moreover, not only the acquisition, but 
also the utilization of linguistic knowledge does not seem to imply a reference to the 
formalized rules of language, but rather an automatic and mostly unconsciously 
reference to the acquired abilities: ”the knowledge of grammatical structures (…) is 
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not present in a conscious way in most of the cases where we use the language 
effectively and perfectly correctly” (Damasio, 1999, 357)1. 
Other examples of cognitive forms, not skill-like nor background-like, of tacit 
knowledge come from the substantial number of studies on implicit learning 
processes (Reber, 1993; Cleeremans, 1995; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz and Boyer, 
1998), in particular those relating to experiments in artificial grammar and 
probabilistic sequence learning2. On the whole, it is possible to say that research on 
implicit learning shows how subjects are able to make use of the hidden structural 
characteristics that make up the essence of a given phenomenon, though they are not 
able to come to the complete and explicit knowledge of these same characteristics. 
The knowledge that enables the subjects of implicit learning experiments to obtain 
this type of results can be considered, together with linguistic knowledge, as a type of 
tacit knowledge that is neither a purely physical “skill”, nor a form of “familiarity” or 
“background” knowledge. We propose to define this kind of tacit knowledge as 
implicit cognitive rules that can guide the actions and decisions of a subject while at 
the same time remaining confined to the tacit domain. The type of tacit knowledge 
subjects seem able to develop in implicit learning experiments is knowledge that can 
not be expressed and at the same time surely has a direct causal impact on subjects’ 
decisions and performances. We can consider it as a kind of tacit analogue of other 
well known cognitive mechanisms such as pragmatic schemes, heuristics, mental 
models and so on. As it is knowledge able to influence the decisions made by the 
subject, it is a real cognitive rule, that is held in an implicit way. For this reason we 
propose to categorize it as implicit  cognitive rules. 
Even if empirical research on this type of tacit knowledge is still in great part lacking, 
we suspect that it may be considered as an important element in the development of 
heuristics, rules of thumb and case-based expertise that are commonly used in 
decision-making processes (Gigerenzer, 2000). In economic literature, we might  find 
this type of tacit knowledge being described as a component of “expert knowledge” 
and of “organizational routines” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Cohen, Burkhart, 
Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien and Winter, 1997). We believe the clarification of 
this elements to be one of the main future topics for the future advancement of tacit 
knowledge research in cognitive science and in economics both. 
 
2.2 As we previously mentioned the potential for the development in information and 
communication technologies should significantly extend the realm of explicit 
knowledge and confine tacit knowledge to an increasingly marginal role (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994; Foray and Cowan, 1997; Foray and Steinmueller, 2003). 
 
1 Even if in certain cases it is possible to admit that, in the case of language, we can reach the formulation of an explicit 
rule, the fact remains that the total formalisation and codification of linguistic knowledge has not yet been reached, in 
spite of the considerable research efforts expended over the years. 
2 To remain in the field of neurosciences, further empirical evidence supporting the role of tacit knowledge in individual 
cognitive processes comes also from research on implicit memory and perception phenomena (cfr. Atkinson, Thomas 
and Cleeremans, 2000; Raichle, 1998; Zeman, 2001). 
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As correctly pointed out by Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall, this type of reasoning 
cannot be conducted in the abstract, but must take into account the fact that different 
forms of knowledge can have different degrees of codifiability.  
More current and precise informations on the different forms of codifiability and 
transmission of tacit knowledge come from the work of Margherita Balconi, who 
analyses with extreme detail how the processes of codification have taken place over 
these last years in different industrial sectors (steel, semiconductors, mechanical). 
Balconi correctly points out how different forms of complementarity/substitutability 
can exist between tacit knowledge and ICTs: while some types of tacit knowledge 
can be substituted by ICTs, others have to be considered complementary to ICTs: 
 
“Tacit skills which have been substituted by codified know how 
and have become obsolete in most modern manufacturing 
processes, are those relying on the perceptions of sensory organs 
or manual ability. (…) Either their tacit knowledge has been 
codified and the execution of their activity assigned to a 
machine/instrument, or a technological innovation has changed the 
production process and made their specific knowledge obsolete. 
(…) Tacit skills which complement codified and automated 
manufacturing processes are those heuristics and interpretative 
skills which serve to decode and assign meaning to information-
bearing messages (structured data inputs, codified know-how) and 
to create novelties” (Balconi, 2002, 31). 
 
A study  conducted on innovation in the biotechnology sector enabled to collect 
empirical evidence that shows how, even in the high tech sector,  tacit knowledge as 
competence has an important role in innovation processes, but it is also relatively 
easy to transfer to other subjects (Viale and Pozzali, 2003; Pozzali, 2004a). There are 
two principal methods with which this transmission can take place: 
 
- the embodiment of the subject’s tacit knowledge inside an automatic 
device that mimics the subject's performance step by step; 
- the construction of algorithms that make use of the calculation power of 
an electronic processor to elaborate, wherever possible, computationally 
highly complex processes which manage to achieve the same results that 
the subjects are able to achieve by using physical and perceptive abilities 
impossible to implement in a technological device. 
 
What is even more interesting in Balconi’s work, however, concerns the second 
aspect, the one related to tacit knowledge that must be considered complementary to 
ICTs and not substitutable or codifiable. This type of knowledge is made up of 
heuristics of judgment, specific problem solving abilities, and individual intuitive 
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capacities that have a specifically cognitive character, at the base of which we can 
trace a precise correlation of a neurological type: 
 
“These categories draw upon the way the human brain functions, 
on the basis of pattern matching (Ginsberg, 1998). Humans have a 
clear advantage over computers in those situations that need to be 
addressed through a method of pattern matching instead of 
computing” (Balconi, 2003, 362). 
 
The suggestions that come from the empirical research conducted by Balconi can be 
inserted in that line of reflection on problems of tacit knowledge that detects in the 
sphere of pattern matching and of signalling activities (that is, the activation of a 
given behavioral or cognitive response to the repeated exposure to a series of external 
stimuli characterized by structural regularity: cfr. Dewey and Bentley, 1949) an 
extremely promising field of research (Gourlay, 2002; Pozzali, 2004b). Within this 
field it is possible, in fact, to find examples of those cognitive forms of tacit 
knowledge, (that is tacit knowledge as implicit cognitive rules), that are acquired and 
transmitted through processes of implicit learning like the ones mentioned above. 
This type of tacit knowledge is not easily codified or transmitted and ICT 
technologies, in this sense, are not a great help (Balconi, 2002, 359). 
It is precisely this type of tacit knowledge that represents a kind of “cognitive 
bottleneck”, which economic literature and studies on technological innovation and 
processes of technological transfer will inevitably have to consider.  
 
 




3.1 The tripartition described above does not mean that there are no connections and 
blurred boundaries between the three types of tacit knowledge. In particular, the 
relationship between BK and ICRs appears to be one of strong cognitive integration. 
The close relationship between BK and ICRs is highlighted in the results of numerous 
studies on developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology. Our inferential and 
heuristic skills appear to be based on typical components of BK. Moreover, our 
reasoning, judgment, and decision-making processes seem to rely on principles that 
are genetically inherited from our parents. 
Infants are endowed with an innate set of principles that allows them to begin to 
interact with the world. Data reported by developmental psychologists show how the 
capacity for reasoning and decision-making is built on a foundation of implicit 
principles, of innate origin, contained in the child’s  tacit background knowledge. In 
addition to the universal principles described earlier, the child also assimilates 
cultural-based schemes and principles that determine the development of cognitive 
10  
 
styles valid only at local level (Viale, 2006). These take the form of principles, 
values, and theories of a metaphysical, ontological and epistemological nature that 
vary depending on the cultural context and which generate different implicit 
cognitive rules. These different rules provide a unique characterisation of the 
perception and representation external reality, the use empirical data inductively, the 
use  deductive methods of reasoning, of categorising phenomena, of making 
probability judgments, etc. This cultural and acquired aspect of BK gives rise to 
profound differences between various cultural areas in terms of the cognitive style of 
ICRs. A case in point is provided in the studies of the cognitive and perceptive 
differences among Asians and Americans reported by Nisbett and Masuda (2006), 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi and Norenzayan (2001) and Nisbett (2003). They rely on an 
impressive number of cognitive tests that try to compare the manner of reasoning of 
North Americans, mainly university students, and East Asians –Korean, Chinese and 
Japanese – mainly university students. The East Asians and the Americans respond in 
qualitatively different ways to the same stimulus situation in many different tests. For 
example, American participants showed large primacy effects in judgements about 
co-variation, whereas Chinese participants showed none. “Control illusion” increased 
the degree of co-variation seen and the reported accuracy of Americans but tended to 
have the opposite effects on Chinese. Koreans were greatly influenced in their causal 
attribution by the sort of situational information that has no effect for Americans. 
Koreans showed great hindsight bias effects under conditions where Americans 
showed none. Finally, Americans responded to contradiction by polarising their 
beliefs, whereas Chinese responded by moderating their beliefs.  
 
We can summarise the results as follows. 
 
The American vs. East Asian style of thinking (Nisbett et al., 2001). 
1) Explanation: East Asians tend to explain events, both social and physical, more 
with respect to the field and Americans tend to explain events more with respect 
to a target object and its properties. 
2) Prediction and “postdiction”: East Asians tend to make predictions with 
reference to a wider variety of factors than Americans do. Consequently, they 
are less surprised by any given outcome and they are more prone to “hindsight 
bias”, or the tendency to regard events as having been inevitable in retrospect. 
3) Attention: since East Asians locate causality in the field instead of the object, 
they tend to be more accurate at “co-variation detection”, that is the perception 
of relationship within the field. 
4) Control: Americans are more subject to the “illusion of control”, that is, a 
greater expectation of success when the individual is involved in interaction 
with the object – even when that interaction could not logically have an effect on 
the outcome. 
5) Relationships and similarities vs. rules and categories: East Asians tend to 
group objects and events on the basis of their relationships to one another, for 
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example, “A is a part of B”. Americans would be expected to group them more 
on the basis of category membership, for example, “A and B are both Xs”. 
Americans are inclined to learn rule-based categories more readily than East 
Asians and to rely on categories more for purposes of inductive and deductive 
inference. 
6) Logic vs. experiential knowledge: East Asians are more influenced by prior 
beliefs in judging the soundness of a formal argument. Americans are more able 
to a set aside prior beliefs in favour of reasoning based on logical rules. 
7) Dialectics vs. the law of non-contradiction: East Asians are inclined to seek 
compromise solutions to problems (“Middle Way”) and to reconcile 
contradictory propositions. Americans tend to seek solutions to problems in 
which a given principle drives out all but one competing solution, to prefer 
arguments based on logic, and to reject one or both of two propositions that 
could be construed as contradicting one another. 
 
The crucial thesis of Nisbett et al. (2001) and Nisbett & Masuda (2006) is that the 
different ways of reasoning, that is the different ICRs, are not a contingent and 
superficial feature, but  are rooted in two completely different systems of thinking, 
that is, in different metaphysical and epistemological principles contained in the BK, 
that shape  American and East Asian cognition differently. These two different 
systems of thinking originated causally from two different socio-cultural 
environments: the old Greek trading society and classical philosophy on one hand 
and the old Chinese agricultural society and Confucian philosophy on the other. In 
fact, according to them, social organisation and economic structure are the major 
determinants of the causal chain metaphysics-epistemology-cognition. Different 
socio-economic configurations generate fixed irreversible different causal chains.  
Different social and economic variables gave birth to different styles of thought that 
we can summarise under the heading of “holistic” and “analytic” thought. Nowadays, 
these different styles of thought continue to be effective in differentiating the 
reasoning processes of contemporary Americans and East Asians.  
 
Norenzayan (2006) also confirms, experimentally, the results of Nisbett & Masuda 
(2006), Nisbett (2003) and Nisbett et al. (2001). The cultural differences between 
Western and Asiatic populations are examined in a variety of cognitive tasks that 
involve formal and intuitive reasoning. “Formal reasoning is rule-based, emphasises 
logical inference, represents concepts by necessary and sufficient features, and 
overlooks sense experience when it conflicts with rules of logic. Intuitive reasoning is 
experience-based, resists decontextualising or separating form from content, relies on 
sense experience and concrete instances, and overlooks rules and logic when they are 
at odds with intuition. The reasoning of European American, Asian American, and 
East Asian university students was compared under conditions where a cognitive 
conflict was activated between formal and intuitive strategies of thinking. The test 
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showed that European Americans were  more willing to set aside intuition and follow 
rules than East Asians”.  
Norenzayan (2006)) agrees with the previous consideration about the relationships 
between BK and ICRs. The human mind is equipped with basic cognitive primitives 
and possesses cognitive processes that carry out many tasks, such as exemplar-based 
categorisation, deductive reasoning, causal attribution, and so on. However, this basic 
endowment does not rule out differentiated development in response to cultural and 
environmental stimuli. These differences are manifested in various ways. Firstly, 
different cultural practices can make a given cognitive process, which is universally 
available in principle, accessible in a differentiated way. Asians appear to have a 
greater propensity than Westerners for exemplar-based categorisation, and a lesser 
propensity to decontextualise deductive arguments  tending more to explain 
behaviour by referring to the situational context. Secondly, through discoveries and 
inventions, societies often introduce artificial and complex new ways of thinking 
which differentiate one culture from another. One needs only think of the statistic and 
probabilistic revolution in the 17th century and its impact on Western rationality and 
decision-making models, or of the development and influence of the ancient Taoist 
notion of yin and yang in the contemporary Chinese way of reasoning in relation to 
modal concepts like change, moderation and relativism. 
 
In conclusion, the cultural diversities of BK lead to different ICRs. This diversity at 
the level of BK is often an underlying factor for difficulties involving social 
coordination and the communication and transmission of knowledge. This can often 
be seen in the relationship between individuals belonging to radically different 
cultures, for example from Eastern and Western cultures: 
 
“There are very dramatic social-psychological differences 
between East Asians as a group and people of European culture 
as a group. East Asians live in an interdependent world in which 
the self is part of a large whole; Westerners live in a world in 
which the self is a unitary free agent. 
Easterners value success and achievement in good part because 
they reflect well on the groups they belong to; Westerners value 
these things because they are badges of personal merit. 
Easterners value fitting in and engage in self-criticism to make 
sure that they do so; Westerners value individuality and strive to 
make themselves look good. Easterners are highly attuned to the 
feelings of others and strive for interpersonal harmony; 
Westerners are more concerned with knowing themselves and are 
prepared to sacrifice harmony for fairness. Easterners are 
accepting of hierarchy and group control; Westerners are more 
likely to prefer equality and scope for personal action. Asians 
avoid controversy and debate; Westerners have faith in the 
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rhetoric of argumentation in arenas from the law to politics to 
science.” (Nisbett, 2003, pp.76.77) 
 
The different composition of BK in terms of its principles and values generates 
profound differences between various aspects of everyday life and social 
organisation. In particular, as is highlighted by Nisbett (2003, pp.193-201), there are 
dramatic differences in the way in which medicine, science, law, contracts, conflicts, 
rhetoric, political relations, human rights and religion are developed and perceived. 
These differences emerge as the result of contextual diversity in the causal 
relationship between BK and ICRs. Such diversity is also found in more 
homogeneous cultural settings.  
  
3.2 The dependence of implicit cognitive rules from tacit background knowledge can 
be explained by cognitive science. Infants are endowed with an innate set of 
principles that allows them to begin to interact with the world. Among these 
principles, one of the most important allows a causal attribution to relations between 
physical events. At around the age of 6 months, the infant is able to apply the 
principle of cohesion – a moving object maintains its connectedness and boundaries – 
the principle of continuity – a moving object traces exactly one connected path over 
space and time – and the principle of contact – objects move together if and only if 
they touch (Spelke, Phillips & Woodward, 1995). Moreover, there are theories of 
biology and of psychology. These theories show that infants individuate some 
theory-specific causal mechanisms to explain interactions among the entities in a 
domain. A child has an intuition of what characterises a living being from an artefact 
or an object. Between the ages of 2 and 5, the child assumes that external states of 
affairs may cause mental states and that there is a causal chain from perception to 
beliefs to intentions and to actions (see Sperber, Premack & Premack, Eds., 1995). 
What are the features of these principles? Data from developmental studies and a 
certain universality of causal perception in cross-cultural studies seem to support the 
hypothesis that we are endowed with early-developed cognitive structures 
corresponding to maturational properties of the mind-brain. They orient the subject’s 
attention towards certain types of clues, but they also constitute definite presumptions 
about the existence of various ontological categories, as well as what can be expected 
from objects belonging to those different categories. Moreover, they provide subjects 
with “modes of construal” (Keil, 1995), different ways of recognising similarities in 
the environment and making inferences from them. These principles constitute a core 
of probably innate “intuitive theories” which are implicit and constrain the later 
development of the explicit representations of the various domains. As Gelman 
highlights, “different sets of principles guide the generation of different plans of 
action as well as the assimilation and structuring of experiences” (1990, p. 80). They 
establish the boundaries for each domain which single out stimuli that are relevant to 
the conceptual development of the domain. Data reported by developmental 
psychologists show how the capacity for reasoning and decision-making is built on a 
14  
 
foundation of implicit principles, of innate origin, contained in the child’s  tacit 
background knowledge. In addition to the universal principles described earlier, the 
child also assimilates culture-based schemes and principles that determine the 
development of cognitive styles valid only at local level (Viale, 2006). These take the 
form of principles, values, and theories of a metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological nature that vary depending on cultural context and which generate 
different implicit cognitive rules. These different rules provide a unique 
characterisation of the way of perceiving and representing external reality, the way of 
using empirical data inductively, of using deductive methods of reasoning, of 
categorising phenomena, of making probability judgments, etc. This cultural and 
acquired aspect of BK gives rise to profound differences between various cultural 
areas in terms of the cognitive style of ICRs. 
The dependence of ICR from BK is not justified by the cognitive theories that  
support an autonomous syntactic mental logic. According to these theories (Beth and 
Piaget, 1961; Braine, 1978; Rumain, Connell and Braine, 1983) the mind contains a 
natural deductive logic (which for Piaget is the propositional calculus) that allows to 
do some inference and not other. For example the human mind is able to apply the 
modus ponens and not modus tollens. In the same way, we could also presuppose  the 
existence of a natural probability calculus, causal reasoning rule, risk assessment rule, 
and so on.   Many empirical studies and some good theories give an alternative 
explanation that neglect the existence of mental logic and of other syntactic rules (for 
the pragmatic scheme theories: Cheng and Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cheng and Nisbett, 
1993; for the mental models theory: Johnson Laird, 1983, 2007; for the conceptual 
semantic  theory see Jackendoff, 2007). The first point is that there are many rules 
that are not applied when the format is abstract, but which are applied when the 
format is pragmatic, that is when it is linked to every-day experience. For example 
the solution of the selection task problem, that is the successful application of modus 
tollens,  is possible when the questions are not abstract but are linked to problems of 
everyday life  (Politzer, 1986; Politzer and Nguyen-Xuan, 1992).  The second point is 
that, most of the time, the rules are implicitly learned through  pragmatic experience 
(Reber, 1993; Cleeremans, 1995; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz and Boyer, 1998). The 
phenomenon of implicit learning seems so strong that it occurs even when the 
cognitive faculties are compromised.  From recent studies (Grossman, Smith, et al, 
2005) with Alzheimer patients it seems that they are able to learn rules implicitly but 
not explicitly. Moreover,  the rules that are learnt  explicitly in a class or are part of 
the inferential repertoire of experts are often not applied in everyday life or in test 
based on intuition (see the experiments with statisticians of Kaheneman and 
Tversky).   
At the same time the  pragmatic experience and the meaning that people give to the 
social and natural events are driven by  background knowledge (Searle, 1995 and 
2008; Smith and Kossylin, 2007). The values, principles, and categories of 
background knowledge, stored in memory, allow us to interpret  reality, to make 
inferences,  to act, that is to have a pragmatic experience. Therefore,  background 
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knowledge affects  implicit learning and the application of the cognitive rules through 
the pragmatic and semantic dimension of  reasoning and decision making3. The 
mental structure that connects background knowledge and cognitive rules can be 
represented by a schema (an evolution of the semantic network of Collins and 
Quillian, 1969), that is a structured representation that captures the information that 
typically applies to a situation or event (Barsalou, 2000). They establish a  set of 
relations that links properties. Thus the schema for  a birthday party might include  
guests, gifts, cakes, and so on. The structure is that the guests give gifts to the 
birthday celebrant, and that everyone eats cake, and so on. What it is important is that 
the relationships within schemas and among different schemas allow us to make 
inferences, that is,  they correspond to the implicit cognitive rules. For example  
consider our schema for glass. It specifies that if an object made of glass falls onto a 
hard surface, the object may break. This is an example of causal inference. Similar 
schemas can allow you to make inductive, deductive, analogical inferences, to solve 
problems and to take decisions (Markman & Gentner, 2001; Ross, 1996).  In 
conclusion the schema theory seems to be a good candidate to explain the 
dependence of ICR from BK.       
 
4) OBSTACLES TO KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER (2): COGNITIVE STYLES 
 
4.1 Usually the obstacles to the collaboration between universities and companies are 
analyzed comparing entrepreneurs or managers and academic scientists (plus the 
academic TTO officers as in the case of Siegel et al. , 1999). In my opinion this 
choice is correct in the case of transfer of patent and in licensing technology, because 
the relation is between academic scientist and entrepreneur or manager, often through 
academic TTO officer. Different situation is that of collaboration between the 
university and industrial labs in order to achieve a common goal, like development of 
a prototype,  invention of a new technology,  solution to an industrial problem, and so 
on. In these cases the interaction is mainly between academic and industrial 
researchers. Entrepreneurs, managers and TTO officers might play only the role of 
starting and  making easier the  relation. Since the academy-industry relations don’t 
reduce themselves only to patents and licences (Agarwal and Henderson, 2003) but 
find in the joint research collaboration their priority, I prefer to focus on academic 
and industrial researchers behaviours. As I wrote above,  previous studies on  
obstacles between universities and companies  analyzed only superficial economic, 
legal,  and organizational aspects, mainly focused in  transfer of patents and licences. 
Since  research collaboration  implies a complex phenomenon of linguistic and 
cognitive coordination and attuning among  members of the research group I think 
that a deeper cognitive investigation about this dimension might give some 
interesting answer to  academy-industry problem. The main hypothesis is that there 
 
3 It is not clear if the process is not linear but circular and recursive. In this case  the cognitive rules might become part 
of the background knowledge and that could change its role in the pragmatic experience and in the reasoning and 
decision making processes. 
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can be different cognitive styles in thinking, problem solving, reasoning and decision 
making that can hamper the collaboration between academic and industrial 
researchers. These different cognitive styles are  linked and mostly determined by a 
different set of values and norms that are part of background knowledge (as we have 
seen above). Different background knowledge is also responsible of bad linguistic 
coordination and understanding and of the difficulty of a successfull psychology of 
group.  
The general hypotheses that will be inferred in this paper represent a research 
programme of empirical tests to control the effects on cognitive styles of different 
scientific and technological domains and  geographical contexts. 
    
4.2 What is  the different background knowledge between university and industrial 
labs  and how can this influence  cognitive styles?  
There were studies in the sociology of science  that have focused on the values and 
principles that drive  scientific and industrial  research.  
Academic research seems to be governed by a set of norms and values that are close 
to Mertonian ethos (Merton, 1973). Communitarism, scepticism, originality, 
disinterestedness, universalism and so on were proposed by Robert Merton as the 
social norms of scientific community. He justified theoretically the proposal. Other 
authors like Mitroff (1974) criticized the Mertonian ethos on an empirical base. He 
discovered that scientists follow often the Mertonian norms. Nevertheless there are 
cases in which they seem to follow the contrary of the norms. More recent studies 
(Broesterhuizen and Rip, 1984) confirm most of the norms of Merton. The research 
should be Strategic, founded on Hybrid and interdisciplinary communities, able to 
stimulate the Innovative critique, Public and based on Scepticism (SHIPS). Recent 
studies (Siegel et al., 1999; Viale, 2001) confirm the presence of social norms that 
remind the Mertonian ethos. Scientist believe in the pursuit of knowledge per se, in 
the innovative role of critique, in the universal dimension of the scientific enterprise, 
in science as a public good. They believe in scientific method based on empirical 
testing, comparison of hypotheses, better problem solving and truth as representation 
of the world (Viale, 2001, 216-219). The fact that scientists have these beliefs don’t 
prove that they act accordingly. The beliefs can be deviated by contingent interests 
and opportunistic reasons. They could also represent the pretended image of what 
they want to show to society. They also can vary from one discipline and 
specialization to another.  Nevertheless the presence of these beliefs seems to 
characterize the cultural identity of academic scientists. Therefore they constitute part 
of their background knowledge and they can influence the implicit cognitive rules for 
reasoning and decision making. On the contrary industrial researchers are driven by 
norms that are contrary to  academic ones. They can be summarized by the acronym 
PLACE (Ziman, 1987): Propriety, Local, Authoritarian, Commissioned, Expert.  The 
research is commissioned by the company that has the ownership of  results, that 
can’t be diffused, and  are valid locally to improve the competiveness of the 
company. The researchers are subjected to authoritarian decisions of the company 
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and they develop a particular  expertise valid locally. PLACE is a set of norms and 
values that characterizes the cultural identity of industrial researchers. They constitute 
part of their background knowledge and they may influence the inferential processes 
of reasoning and decision making. 
To sum up, the state of art of studies on social norms in academic and industrial 
research seems insufficient and empirically obsolete. A new empirical study of  
norms contained in the background knowledge is essential. The study should control 
the main features characterizing cultural identity of academic and industrial 
researchers, established by previous studies. They can be summarized in  following 
way: 
 
Criticism vs. Dogmatism: academic researchers follow the norm of systematic 
critique, scepticism, falsificatory control of knowledge produced by colleagues; 
industrial researchers aim at maintaining knowledge that works in solving 
technological problems. 
 
 Interest vs. Indifference: academic researchers are not pushed in their activity mainly 
by  economic interest but by epistemological goals; industrial researchers are pushed 
mainly by economic ends like  technological competiveness, commercial primacy, 
and capital gain.    
 
Universalism vs. Localism: academic researchers believe in a universal audience of 
peers,  in  universal criteria of judgement that can establish their reputation; industrial 
researchers think locally both for the audience and for the criteria of judgement and 
social promotion.  
 
Comunitarism vs. Esclusivism: academic researchers believe in the public and open 
dimension of pool of knowledge which they must contribute to increase; industrial 
researchers believe in the private and proprietary features of knowledge.     
    
4.3 To the different backgrounds we should  add also the different contingent features 
of the contexts of decision making (we refer to the decision-making context of 
research managers, that is heads of a research unit or of a research group) that 
become operational norms. The main features are related to time, results and funding.  
In the pure academic context4 the time for doing research is usually loose. There are 
some temporal requirements when one is working with funds coming from a public 
call, but,  in a contract with a public agency or government department the deadline is 
usually not so strict, and  the requested results  are quite not well defined and  not 
specified as to a particular product (e.g. a prototype or a new molecule or a new 
theorem). Therefore,  time constraints don’t press the reasoning and decision making 
processes of the researchers. On the contrary when an academic researcher works 
with an industrial contract, the time constraints are similar to those of the corporate 
 
4 The analysis refers mainly to academic environment of  Universities of Continental Europe. 
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researcher. Moreover, in a fixed given time a precise set of results must be produced 
and presented to the company. According to  private law the clauses of a contract 
with a company can be very punitive for the researcher and for the university that 
don’t follow the signed expected requirements. In any case the effect of sub-optimal 
results for an academician working with a company are less punitive than for a 
corporate researcher. For him the time pressure is heavier because the results, in a 
direct or semi direct way, are linked to the commercial survival of the company. Sub-
optimal behaviour increases the risks for his career and also for his job. Therefore the 
great expectations on the fast production of positive concrete results press him in a 
heavier way. The different environmental pressure may generate a different  adaptive 
psychology of time and a different adaptive ontology of what the result of the 
research might be. In the case of  academic research,  time might be less discounted. 
That is,  future events tend not to be so underestimated as  might happen in industrial 
research. The corporate researcher might fall into the bias of time discounting and 
myopia because of the overestimation of  short term results. Even the ontology of an 
academic researcher in respect to the final products of the research might be different 
from the corporate one. While the former is interested in a declarative ontology that 
aims at the expression of the result   in linguistic form (i.e. a report, a publication, a 
speech) the second aims at an object ontology. The results for him should be linked in 
a direct or indirect way to the creation of an object (i.e. a new molecule, a new 
machine, a new material, or a new process to produce them, or a patent that describe 
the process to produce them).   
The third,  different operational norm concerns  financial possibilities. In this case it 
is not a problem of  quantity of funding. The funding for academic research is usually 
less for each unity of research (or, better, for each researcher) than that in industrial 
research. But the crucial problem is the psychological weight of the funds. That is,  
how much the funds constraint and affect the reasoning and decision making 
processes of the researchers. In other words ceteris paribus the amount of money at 
disposal, how much the cognitive processes and in particular the attention processes 
refer to  a sort of value for money judgment in deciding how to act. From this point of 
view it seems - but it is a topic to be investigated -  that the psychological weight of 
money on academic researchers is less than on industrial researchers. Money is 
perceived with less value and therefore, influences decision making less. The reasons 
for this different mental representation and evaluation may come from: a) the way in 
which the funding is communicated and it can constitute a decision frame (with more 
frequency and  relevance in the company because it is linked to the important 
decision of the annual budget); b) the symbolic representation of the money (with 
much greater emphasis in the company that has its raison d’etre  in the commercial 
success of its products and in its increased earnings); c) from the social identity of the 
researchers linked more or less strongly to the monetary levels of the wage (with  
greater importance to the monetary level as an indicator of a successful career in a 
private company than in the university). The different psychological weight of the 
money has been analyzed by many authors, and in particular by Thaler (1999). 
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To summarize the operational norms can be schematized in loose time vs. pressing 
time;   undefined results vs. well-defined results; financial lightness vs. financial 
heaviness. 
 
4.4  How  can the values in background knowledge and the operational norms   
influence the implicit cognitive rules of reasoning and decision making, and how are 
they  an obstacle to the collaboration among industrial and academic researchers?  
There are many aspects of  cognition that are important in  research activity. We can 
say that every aspect is involved, from motor activity to perception, memory, 
attention, reasoning, decision making and so on. Our aim however is to focus on the 
cognitive obstacles to the reciprocal communication, understanding,  joint decision 
making and coordination between academic and corporate researchers and how that 
might  hinder their collaboration.  
I will analyse 6 dimensions of the interaction: language, group,  thinking, problem 
solving, reasoning, and decision making.  
 
1) It might be interesting to investigate  the pragmatic aspects of communication. To 
collaborate on a common project means to communicate, mainly by natural 
language. To collaborate means to exchange information in order to coordinate 
one’s own actions to pursue a common aim. This means “using language”, as in 
the title of Clark’s book (1996), in order to reach the established common goal. 
Any linguistic act is at the same time an individual and a social act. It is individual 
because it is the subject that by motor and cognitive activity articulates the sounds 
that correspond to words and phrases and it is the subject that receives these 
sounds and makes the interpretation. Or in Goffman’s (1981) terminology about 
the linguistic roles, it is the subject that vocalizes, formulates, and means and it is 
another subject that attends the vocalization, identifies the utterances and 
understands the meaning (Clark, 1996, p.21). It is social because every linguistic 
act of a speaker has the aim to communicate something to one or two addressees 
(also in the case of private settings where we talk to ourselves because we 
ourselves play the role of an addressee). In order to achieve this goal there should 
be a coordination between the speaker’s meaning and the addressee’s 
understanding of the communication. But  meaning and understanding is based on 
the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions  shared, that is, in  shared background 
knowledge. Therefore the first important point is that it is impossible for two or 
more actors of a conversation to coordinate meaning and understanding without 
reference to their common background knowledge. “A common background is the 
foundation for all joint actions and that makes it essential to the creation of the 
speaker’s meaning and addressee’s understanding as well” (Clark, 1996, p. 14). A 
common background is shared by the members of the same cultural community.   
A second important point is that the coordination between meaning and 
understanding is more effective when  the same physical environment is shared (the 
same room in university or the same bench in a park)  and the vehicle of 
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communication is the richest possible. The environment represents a communicative 
frame that can influence  meaning and  understanding. Even more,  gestures and 
facial expressions are rich in non-linguistic information and therefore  are very 
important aids for  coordination. From this point  face-to-face conversation is 
considered the basic and most powerful setting of communication.  
The third point is that the more simple and direct  the coordination is the more 
effective the communication. There are different ways of making communication 
complex. The roles of speaking and listening (see above regarding  linguistic roles) 
can be decoupled. Spokesmen, ghost writers, and translators, are examples of 
decoupling. A spokeswoman for a minister is only a vocalizer, while the formulation 
is the ghost writer’s and the meaning is the minister’s. Obviously, in this case, the 
coordination of meaning and understanding becomes more difficult (also because it is 
an institutional setting with many addressees). The non-verbal communication of the 
spokesman might be inconsistent with the meaning of the minister and the ghost 
writer might not be able to formulate correctly this meaning.  Moreover in many 
types of discourse – plays, story telling, media news, reading – there is more than one 
domain of action. The first layer is the layer of the real conversation. The second 
layer is that of the hypothetical domain that is created by the speaker (when he is 
describing a story). By recursion there can be higher layers as well. For example the 
play requires   three layers: the first is the real world interaction among the actors, the 
second is the fictional role of the actors, and the third is the communication with the 
audience. In face-to-face conversation there is only one layer and no decoupling. The 
role of vocalizing, formulating, and meaning is in the same person. And the domain 
of action  identifies itself with the conversation. The coordination is direct without 
intermediaries. Therefore it is the most effective way of coordinating  meaning and 
understanding with a minor distortions of meaning  and less misunderstandings.  
Academic and industrial researchers are members of different cultural communities, 
therefore they have different background knowledge. In the collaboration between 
academic and industrial researchers the coordination between meanings and 
understandings can be difficult if the background knowledge is different. When this is 
the case, as we have seen before, the result of the various linguistic settings will  
likely be the distortion of meaning and misunderstanding. When  fundamental values 
are different (SHIPS vs. PLACE) and also when the operational norms of loose time 
vs. pressing time;   undefined product vs. well defined product; financial lightness vs. 
financial heaviness are different it is impossible to transfer the knowledge without 
losing or distorting shares of  meaning.  
 Moreover, difficult coordination will increased in settings that utilize intermediaries 
between the academic inventor and the potential industrial user (mediated settings in 
Clark, 1996, p. 5). These are  cases of an intermediate technology transfer agent (as in 
the case of the members of TTO of university or private of government TTA) that 
tries to transfer  knowledge from the university to corporate labs. In this case, there is 
decoupling of speaking. The academic researcher is he who formulates and gives 
meaning to the linguistic message (also in a written setting), while the TT agent is 
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only a vocalizer. Therefore, there may be frequent distortion of the original meaning, 
in particular when the knowledge contains a great share of tacit knowledge. This 
distortion is strengthened by the likely different background knowledge of the TT 
agent in respect to the other two actors in the transfer. The TT agents are members of 
a different cultural community (if they are professional from a TT private company) 
or from different sub-communities inside the university (if they are members of 
TTO). Usually they are  neither active academic researchers nor corporate 
researchers.  Finally, in the technology transfer there can be also the complexity of 
having more than one domain of action. For example, if the relation between an 
academic and industrial researcher is not face-to-face, but is instead mediated by an 
intermediary there is an emergent second layer of discourse. This  is the layer of the 
story that is told by the intermediary about the original process and the techniques to 
generate the technology invented by the academic researchers. The story can also be 
communicated with the help of a written setting, for example  patent or publication. 
All the three points show that a common background knowledge is essential for 
reciprocal understanding, and that face-to-face communication is a pre-requisite for 
minimizing distortion of meaning and misunderstanding that can undermine  the 
effectiveness of knowledge transfer.  
 
2) The second dimension of analysis is that of the  of the group. When two or more 
persons collaborate to solve a common problem they elicit some interesting 
emergent phenomenon. In theory a group can be a powerful problem solver 
(Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath, 1997). But to be so  members of the group must 
share information, models, values and cognitive processes (Hinsz, Tindale, and 
Vollrath, 1997).  It is likely that the heterogeneity about skill and knowledge 
might be very useful for detecting more easily the solution. Some authors have 
analyzed the role of heterogeneity in cognitive tasks (e.g. the solution of a 
mathematical problem) and generation of ideas (e.g. the production of a new logo) 
and they have found a positive correlation between it and the success in these 
tasks  (Jackson, 1992). In theory, this result seems very likely since finding a 
solution needs to look at the problem from different points of view. Different 
perspectives allow overcoming  the phenomenon of entrenched mental set, that is, 
the fixation on a strategy that normally works well in solving many problems, but 
that does not work well in solving this particular problem (Sternberg, 2009)  
However the diversity that works is about cognitive skills or personality traits 
(Jackson, 1992). On the contrary when the diversity is about values, social 
categories, and professional identity it can hinder  the problem solving ability of 
the group. In fact this heterogeneity generates the categorization of the differences 
and the similarities between the self and the others and  the emergent phenomenon 
of the conflict/distance between ingroup and outgroup   (Van Knippenberg and 
Schippers, 2007). The relational conflict/distance of ingroup vs. outgroup is the 
most social expression of the negative impact of  diversity of background 
knowledge on group problem solving. As it was showed by Manz and Neck 
22  
 
(1995)  without a common background knowledge there is not sharing of  goals, 
of social meaning of the work, of  criteria to assess and to correct the ongoing 
activity, of foresight on the results and on their  impact, and so on. As it is 
described by the theory of teamthink (Manz and Neck, 1995),  the establishment 
of an effective group in problem solving relies on the common sharing of  values, 
beliefs, expectations and a priori on  physical and social world. For example  
academic and industrial researchers present a different approach concerning 
disciplinary identity. The academic has a strong faithfulness towards the 
disciplinary matrix (Kuhn, 1962), that is composed by the members of a discipline 
with their set of disciplinary knowledge and methods. On the contrary the 
industrial researcher tend to be opportunistic in using knowledge and in choosing 
peers. He doesn’t feel to be member of  disciplinary invisible college of peers and 
chooses à la carte  which peer is helpful   and what knowledge  is useful to attain 
the goal of research. This asymmetry between academic and corporate researchers 
is an obstacle to the well functioning of the teamthink. The epistemological and 
social referents are different, therefore the communication becomes a dialogue 
between deafs.   Lastly there is the linguistic dimension. As we have seen above, 
without a common background knowledge the coordination of meaning and 
understanding among the members of the group, that is the fundamental basis of 
collaboration, is impossible. Moreover without a common background knowledge, 
the pragmatic context of communication (Grice, 1989; Sperber and Wilson, 1986) 
doesn’t allow the generation of correct automatic and non automatic inferences 
between speaker and addressee. For example the addressee would not be able to 
generate proper implicatures  (Grice, 1989) to fill the lack of information and the 
elliptical features of the discourse.  
Lastly, different background knowledge influences  problem solving, reasoning 
and decision making activity, in other words the implicit cognitive rules.  
Different implicit cognitive rules mean asymmetry, asynchrony, and dissonance in 
the cognitive coordination among the members of the research group. That means 
obstacle in the knowledge transfer, in the application of academic expertise and 
knowledge to the industrial goal, in the development of an initial prototype or 
technological idea towards a commercial end.  
 
Now I will tackle the hypothetical effect of values and operational norms onto the 
implicit cognitive rules of academic and industrial researchers. 
 
3) The third dimension is about thinking. There are two systems of thinking that 
affects the way how we reason, decide and solve problem. The first is the 
associative system which involves mental operations based on observed 
similarities and temporal contiguities (Sloman, 1996). It can lead to speedy 
responses that are highly sensitive to patterns and to general tendency. This 
system corresponds to the system 1 of Kahneman (2003). The system  represents 
the intuitive dimension of thinking. It is fast, parallel and mainly implicit. It is 
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switched on by emotional and affective factors. Knowledge is mainly procedural. 
It is dominant on the second when the reasoning and decision making must be fast 
without the possibility to analyze all the details of a problem. The second  is the 
rule-based system which involves manipulations based on the relations among 
symbols (Sloman, 1996). It usually requires deliberate slow procedures to reach 
the conclusions. Through this system, we carefully analyze relevant features of the 
available data, based on rules stored in memory. It corresponds to system 2 of 
Kahneman (2003). This system  is slow, serial, mainly explicit. Knowledge is 
mainly declarative. It can be overridden by the first when there is time pressure, 
there are emotional and affective interferences and when the context of decision 
making doesn’t pretend any analytical effort. The intuitive and analytical systems 
can give different results in reasoning and decision making. Generally all the 
heuristics are example of the first system. On the contrary the rational procedures 
of deductive and inductive reasoning are examples of the second. This system is 
switched on when there is epistemic engagement in reasoning and decision 
making  and when the individual shows need for cognition (Cacioppo  and Petty, 
1982). Therefore the intuitive system is responsible of biases and errors of 
everyday life reasoning, whereas the analytical system allow us to reason 
according the canons of rationality. In reality often the first system is more 
adaptive than the second in many instances of everyday life (Gigerenzer, 2007). 
The prevalence of one of the two systems in the cognitive activity of academic 
and industrial researchers will depend from contingent factors, as the need to end 
quickly  the work, but also from the diverse styles of thinking.  I can hypothesize 
that the operational norms of pressing time, well defined results  and the social 
norm of dogmatism and localism will support a propensity to the activity of the 
intuitive system. On the contrary the operational norms of loose time, and 
undefined results, and the social norms of criticism, and universalism can support 
the activity of the analytical system. It is evident the role of time on activation of 
the two systems. Industrial researchers are used to follow time limits and to give 
value to time. Therefore this operational norm influences the speed of reasoning 
and decision making and the activation of the intuitive system. The contrary 
happens in academic labs. The other operational norm regarding the results seems 
less evident. Who has not  constrain of well defined results has the attitude to 
indulge in slow, and attentive way of analyzing the features of the variables and in 
applying rule based reasoning. Who should end with an accomplished work can’t 
stop on analyzing the details and should go quickly to the final results. The social 
norm of criticism is more evident. The tendency to control and to criticize  results 
produced by other scientists strengthens the analytical attitude in reasoning. Any 
form of control is a slow and precise analysis of the logical coherence,  
methodological fitness, and empirical support of a study. On the contrary in 
corporate labs the aim is to use good knowledge for practical results and not to 
increase the knowledge pool by overcoming  previous hypotheses through  control 
and  critique. Finally the social norm of universalism vs. localism is less evident. 
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Scientists believe in a universal dimension of their activity. The rules of scientific 
community should be clear and understandable by the peers. The scientific 
method, the reasoning style and the methodological techniques can’t be 
understood and followed only by a small and local subset of scientists. Therefore 
they should be explicit in order to be diffused to the entire community. Thus the 
universality tends to strengthen the analytical system of mind. The contrary 
happens where there is no need of explicitness of rules and the evaluation is 
locally made by peers according to the working of the final product. 
                
4) The fourth dimension is about problem solving. At the end of ’50 Herbert Simon 
with some colleagues analyzed the effect of professional knowledge in problem 
representation. They discovered the phenomenon of “selective perception”  
(Dearborn & Simon, 1958), that is the relation between different professional roles 
and different problem representations. For example, in explaining the causes of a 
company crisis, marketing manager will represent the problem mainly in terms of 
commercial communication, the staff manger mainly in terms of insufficient 
employment, and the book-keeper mainly in terms of an obsolete book-keeping 
and lack of liquidity. In the case of industrial and academic scientists I can 
suppose that the selective perception will be effective not only in relation with the 
professional and disciplinary roles but  also with   social values and operational 
norms. These norms and values might characterize the problem representation and 
therefore might influence reasoning and decision making. For example in 
representing the problem of a failure of a research programme, industrial 
researchers might point more to  variables like   cost and  time whereas the 
academic scientists might more oriented towards insufficient critical attitude and 
too local approach. Expert from novice are differentiate by different amount, 
organization, and use of knowledge in problem solving. What differentiates expert 
from novice is their schema for solving problems within their own domain of 
expertise. (Glaser and Chi, 1988). The schemas of experts involve large, highly 
interconnected units of knowledge. They are organized according to underlying 
structural similarities among knowledge units. In contrast, the schemas of novices 
involve relatively small and disconnected units of knowledge. They are organized 
according to superficial similarities. (Bryson & al., 1991). Through practice in 
applying strategies experts may automatize various operations. The automatization 
involves consolidating sequences of steps into unified routines that require little or 
no conscious control. Through automatization experts may shift the burden of 
problem solving  from limited-capacity working memory to infinite-capacity long-
term memory. The freeing of their working memory capacity may better enable 
them to monitor their progress and their accuracy during problem solving. 
Novices in contrast, must use their working memory for trying to hold multiple 
features  of a problem and various possible alternatives. This effort may leave 
novices with less working memory available for monitoring and evaluation. 
Another difference between expert and novice problem solvers is the time spent 
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on various aspects of problems. Experts appear to spend more time determining 
how to represent a problem than do novices (Lesgold, 1988), but they spend much 
less time that do novices actually implementing the strategy for solution. Experts 
seem to spend relatively more time than do novices figuring out how to match the 
given information in the problem with their existing schemas. Once they find a 
correct match they quickly can retrieve and implement a problem strategy. Thus 
expert seems to be able to work forward from the given information to find the 
unknown information. In contrast novices seem to spend relatively little time 
trying to represent the problem. Instead, they choose to work backward from the 
unknown information to the given information. In the collaboration between 
academic and industrial scientists a cognitive dissonance might stem from 
asymmetric expertise in problem solving. Industrial researchers can be novice in 
aspects where academic scientists are expert and vice versa. If this is the case the 
opposite backward vs. forward approach and the different time in problem 
representation might produce cognitive dissonance and asymmetry. In any case it 
might be interesting to analyze the time spent by academic and industrial 
researchers in problem representation. The hypothesis is that time pressure 
together with intuitive system of thinking might bring the industrial researchers to 
dedicate less time in problem representation than academic researchers.  
Time pressure can affect the entire problem solving cycle which includes 
(Sternberg, 2009): problem identification, definition of problem, constructing a 
strategy for problem solving, organizing information about a problem, allocation 
of resources, monitoring problem solving, evaluating problem solving. In 
particular it might be interesting to analyze the effect of pressing vs. loose time in 
monitoring and evaluation phases. More time pressures could diminish the time 
devoted to these phases. Also dogmatism can accelerate the time spent for 
monitoring and evaluation whereas criticism might be responsible of better and 
deeper monitoring and evaluation of the problem solution. 
Finally time pressure might have an effect also on incubation.In order to permit 
the old association resulting from negative transfer to weaken one needs to put the 
problem aside for a while without consciously thinking about it. You do allow for 
the possibility that the problem will be processed subconsciously in order to find a 
solution. There are several possible mechanisms for the beneficial effects of 
incubation (Sternberg, 2009). The incubation needs time. Therefore the pressing 
time norm of industrial researcher might hinder the problem solving success. 
 
5) The fifth dimension  is about reasoning. Reasoning is the process of drawing 
conclusions from principles and from evidence. In reasoning  we move from what 
is already known to infer a new conclusion or to evaluate a proposal conclusion. 
There are many features of reasoning that can  differentiate academic and 
corporate scientists. I will concentrate on three aspects of reasoning that are 
crucial in scientific problem solving and that may affect the cognitive coordination 




The first is about probabilistic reasoning aimed to up-to-date an hypothesis 
according some new empirical evidence. In other words how the scientist deals 
with new data in order to strengthen or to weaken a given hypothesis. There is a 
canon of rationality, the Bayes theorem that prescribes how we should reason. The 
mathematical notation is the following: 
 
P(H/D)=P(D/H)P(H)/P(D/H)P(H) + P(D/nonH)P(nonH) 
 
This theorem tells us how to calculate the effect of new information on the 
probability of a thesis. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1980, 1982a and 1982b)  has experimentally proved that often we fall 
in base rate neglect  that is we focus mainly in the new information and we 
neglect the prior probability. For example if we are controlling a theory T having 
prior probability P(T) we tend to neglect it when we have new experimental data 
that change the prior  probability in posterior probability P(T/D). That is we give 
an excessive  weight to new experiments and we forget the old ones compared to 
what it is prescribed by Bayes Theorem. Why do we forget prior probability and 
we give excessive weight to new data?   According to  Bar Hillel (1980) we give 
more weight to new data because we consider them more relevant compared to the 
old ones.  Relevance in this case might  mean more affective or emotional weight 
given to the data and consequently stronger attentional processes on them. An 
opposite conservative phenomenon happens when  the old data are more relevant. 
In this case we tend to ignore  new data.  In the case of industrial researchers an 
hypothesis may be that the time pressure, the financial weight, and well defined 
results tend to give more relevance to new data. New experiments are costly and 
they should be an important step towards the conclusion of the work. Therefore 
they are more relevant and privileged by the mechanisms of attention. On the 
contrary  academic scientists without the influence of cost, time and the conlusion 
of the project can have a more balanced perception of relevance between old and 
new data. 
 
The second is about deductive reasoning and in particular the  hypothesis testing. 
It is well known in propositional logic the rule of modus tollens of conditional 
statements:  
 
T →d   
┐d   
┐T 
 
If a theory T implies an experimental datum d and if d is falsified then the theory 
T is falsified.  The only way to test the truth of a theory is modus tollens, that is 
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trying to find its falsification. In fact it is wrong to test a theory in the following 
way, called the Fallacy of Affirmation of the Consequent: 
 
T →d   
d 
T    no 
 
Modus tollens was popular in philosophy of science, mainly through the work of 
Karl Popper and in cognitive psychology mainly through the work of Peter Wason 
and Phil Johnson Laird. Wason (1966) and Johnson Laird (1983) have proved that 
in formal test people mistake the rule and tend to commit confirmation bias that 
corresponds to the Fallacy of Affirmation of the Consequent. More realistic tests 
(Griggs and Cox, 1982) or tests linked to our pragmatic schemes (Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985, 1989) improved the deductive performances. Also in science 
confirmation bias disappears when the falsificatory data  are easy to produce, and 
non ambiguous (Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney, 1977; Gorman, 1992) . New 
studies that have analyzed the emotional and affective dimension of hypothesis 
testing have found that when individual is emotionally involved in a thesis he will 
tend to commit confirmation bias. The involvement can be various, economic 
(when one has invested money in developing an idea), social (because your social 
position is linked to the success of a project), organizational (because a leader that 
holds a thesis is always right) or biographical (because you have spent many years 
of your life in developing the theory). The emotional content of the theory causes 
a sort of regret phenomenon that pushes the individual to avoid falsification of the 
theory. From this point of view it is likely that financial heaviness and dogmatism 
together with other social and organizational  factors  would induce industrial 
researchers to commit more easily confirmation bias. Research is costly and it is 
fundamental for the commercial survival of company. Therefore their work should 
be successful an the results should be well defined in order also to keep or to 
improve their position. Moreover they don’t follow the academic norm of 
criticism that prescribes the falsificationist approach towards scientific knowledge. 
Contrary to what happen to academic scientists that tend to be critic and  should 
not be obliged to be successful in their research. It is likely that they are less prone 
to confirmation bias. 
 
The third aspect deals with  causal reasoning. It is a fundamental aspect of 
reasoning in science and technology. Most of  models, hypotheses and theories 
representing scientific and technological knowledge are causal. The main 
tenets of experimental method correspond to the technical evolution of Millian 
methods of agreement and difference (Mill, 1887). It is not the place to deepen 
the epistemological discussion on causality and neither  that on causal 
cognition (for a survey on the relationship between epistemological and 
cognitive dimension of causality see Viale, 1997, 1999a, 1999b). The aim of 
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this paper is to single out potential different styles of reasoning between 
academic and corporate researchers. In this case a different approach to causal 
reasoning and causal models might have a strong effect in the cognitive 
coordination. According to Mackie (1974) every causal reasoning is based on a 
causal field, that is the set of relevant variables able to cause the effect. It is 
well known that in front of the same event, for example a car accident or a 
disease, each expert will support a particular causal explanation (for a town 
planner the wrong design of the street, for a doctor the rate of alcohol of the 
driver, for an engineer the bad mechanics of the car, and so on). Usually once 
the expert have identified one of the suspected causes of a phenomenon he 
stops searching for additional alternative causes. This phenomenon is called 
discounting error. From this point of view the  hypothesis may be that the 
different operational norms and social values of academic and corporate 
research may produce different discounting errors. Financial heaviness, 
pressing time, well defined results compared to financial lightness, slow time 
and ill defined results may limit different causal fields of the entire project. For 
example the corporate scientist can find the time as a crucial causal variable for 
the success of the project whereas the academic researcher doesn’t care about 
it. In the same time the academic researcher can find crucial the value of 
universal scientific excellence of the results whereas the industrial researcher 
doesn’t care about it. There is also the possibility of a deeper difference worth 
to be studied. One of the commonest bias in causal reasoning is to infer illusory 
correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1975). We confuse correlations with 
causal relations, that is we fall down in a sort of magical thinking.  According 
to Johnson Laird and Wason (1977) magical thinking happen for association 
based on contiguity, temporal asymmetry and resemblance between two 
events. The associative or intuitive system of thought is responsible of this 
phenomenon. As we know it is switched on when the time is little and there is 
no need of an articulated analysis of the problem. Consequently the values of 
dogmatism and localism and the operational norm of pressing time  and well 
defined results of industrial researchers can be responsible of this causal bias. 
On the contrary the analytic or rule-based system of thought, more present in 
academic reasoning - because of social values of criticism and universalism 
and the operational norms of loose time - can neutralize the danger of illusory 
correlations and magical thinking.                  
 
6) The sixth dimension is about decision making. Decision making involve 
evaluating opportunities and selecting one choice over another. There are many 
effects and biases connected to decision making. I would focus on some aspects of 





                                                
 The first deals with risk. In the psychological literature risk5 is the multiplication 
of loss for the probability, whereas uncertainty is when an event is probable. 
Usually to the risk of loss is associated also the possibility of gain. In many cases 
to a bigger risk  is associated a bigger gain (as in the case of gambling). People 
can have risk adversity when they don’t want to take great risk in order to gain a 
big pay-off. They prefer to bet on red or black and not on a single number. On the 
contrary risk propensity exists when one takes bigger risk for bigger gain. For 
example betting on the least favoured horse with a bigger listing. The risk 
behaviour seems not linear. According to prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) risk propensity is stronger in 
situation of loss and weaker in situation of gain.  A loss of 5 $ cause a negative 
utility bigger than the positive utility caused by the gain of 5$. Therefore people 
react to the loss with risky choices aimed to recover the loss. Another condition 
that increases the risk propensity is  overconfidence (Fischhoff, et al., 1977; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1996) and illusion of control (Langer, 1975). People 
often tend to overestimate the accuracy of their judgements and the probability of 
success of their performance. They believe to have  better control of future events 
than the chance probability. This phenomenon is associated often to the egocentric 
bias of manager and to forms of quasi-magical thinking (like that of a dice player 
that throws the dices after having blown to them and thinks to have a better 
control on the results). Both the perception of loss and the overconfidence happen 
when there is competition, the decisions are charged of economic meaning,  and 
have an economic effect. The operational norm of financial heaviness, and 
pressing time, and the social value of exclusivity, and interest of industrial 
researcher can increase the economic value of the choices, the perception of 
competiveness, and consequently can increase the risk propensity. On the contrary 
the social values of communitarism, and indifference, and the operational norms 
of financial lightness and slow time of academic scientists may create an 
environment that doesn’t induce any perception of loss and overconfidence. Thus 
the behaviour tends to be more risk adverse. 
 
A second feature of decision making  is connected to regret and  loss aversion. 
We see before that according to prospect theory individual doesn’t like to loose 
and react with risk propensity. The loss aversion is based on the regret that  loss 
produce to the individual. The regret is responsible of many effects. One of the 
most important is the irrational escalation (Stanovitch, 1999) in  any kind of 
investment (economic, but also political and affective). When one is involved in 
an investment of money to reach a goal, as the building of a new prototype of 
missile or the creation of a new molecule to care the AIDS, has to consider the 
possibility of failure. One should monitor the various steps of the programme and  
especially when the funds are finished he has to analyze coldly if the project has 
 




some chance to succeed. In this case he should consider the moneys invested in 
the project as sunk cost, forget them and decide rationally. On the contrary people 
tend to be affectively attached to their project (Nozick, 1990; Stanovitch, 1999). 
They feel strong regret in admitting the failure and the loss of money and tend to 
continue the investment in an irrational escalation of wasted money to attain the 
established goal. The psychological mechanism is linked also to prospect theory 
and risk propensity under conditions of loss. The irrational escalation is stronger 
when there is stronger emphasis on the economic importance of the project. That 
is the typical situation of a private company that links the success of their 
technological projects to its commercial survival. The same industrial researchers 
have the perception that their job and the possibility of promotion are linked to the 
success of the technological projects. Therefore it is likely that they will tend more 
easily to fall in an irrational escalation compared to academic researchers that 
have the operational norm of financial lightness, and social norm of indifference 
and whose career is only loosely linked to the success of research projects.   
 
The third aspect of decision making has to do with an irrational bias called myopia 
(Elster,  1979)  or temporal discounting.  People tend to strongly devaluate the 
gains in time. They prefer small gain at once than big gain in the future. Many 
behaviours of everyday life witness this bias. The small pleasure of a cigarette 
today is more than the big gain of being healthy after 20 years. The perceived 
utility of a choice of a certain job without perspective now is  bigger than the 
choice of unstable work now with greater future professional  perspectives. And 
so on. More recently these observations about discount functions have been used 
to study savings for retirement, borrowing on credit cards, and to explain 
addiction.  Drug dependent individuals discount delayed consequences more than 
matched nondependent controls, suggesting that extreme delay discounting is a 
fundamental behaviour process in drug dependence (Bickel & Johnson, 2003). 
Some evidence suggests pathological gamblers also discount delayed outcomes at 
higher rates than matched controls (Petry & Casarella, 1999). All these 
phenomena show a complex risk behaviour. People are risk adverse in the present, 
that is they want to have now a certain satisfaction (effect of drug, pleasure of 
gambling, certainty of a job), whereas they show high risk propensity for the 
future (high risk of death for drug, high risk of becoming poor for gambling, high 
risk of professional decline in the case of a job without perspectives). Usually this 
behaviour is associated with overconfidence and illusion of control. Time 
discounter prefer the present because he thinks to be able to control the output, the 
results beyond any chance esteem.  In the case of industrial researcher and of 
entrepreneurial culture, in general, the need to have results at once, to find fast 
solution to the problems, to assure the share holders and the market that the 
company is fine and is growing seems to match with the propensity with time 
discounting. The future results don’t mind. What it is important is the “now”, that 
is the ability to have  new competitive products to  commercially survive. 
31  
 
Financial heaviness, pressing time, and well defined results might be responsible 
of the attitude to give more weight to the attainment of fast and complete results at 
once with the risk of products that in the future will be defective, little innovative 
and easily overcome by competing products. In the case of academic scientists the 
temporal discounting might be less strong. In fact the three operational norms – 
financial lightness, loose time, and undefined results – together with criticism and 
universalism might immunize them from myopic behaviours. Criticism is 
important because pushes the scientist not to be easily satisfied by quick and 
unripe results that can be easily falsified by the peers. Universalism is important 
because  the academician wishes  to pursue results that are not valid locally, but 
that can be recognized and accepted by the entire community and that can increase 
his scientific reputation. In academic community it is well known that reputation 
is built through a lengthy process, but it is destroyed in a fast way.            
 
     
5) A LITTLE OF DATA FROM AN  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
5.1 We have decided to begin the collection of empirical data on different cognitive 
styles between academic and industrial researchers  starting with a pilot study based 
on some focus groups (Pozzali and Fondazione Rosselli, 2008).  
The focus groups were three and they have been made in Milan in three technological 
sectors, biotechnology, production systems and domotics. 
The participants were 8 on average for each group plus the moderator and an 
observer that registered the data. 
Half of the participants came from university (professors involved in business 
consultancy and technology transfer) and half from entrepreneurial world (manager 
of R&D and industrial researchers). 
The topics of the focus groups were: 
 
-evaluation of time constraints 
-evaluation of regret for financial loss and sunk costs fallacy 
-evaluation of risk behaviour 
-evaluation of values of communitarism vs. exclusivity 
-evaluation of discipline oriented vs, problem oriented in problem solving 
 
5.2 We decided to submit two tests, one for risk behaviour and the other for the sunk 
costs whereas the other topic were analyzed through discussion in the focus group.  
The test for risk behaviour was an adaptation of the “problem of Asiatic disease” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) that showed the presence of frame effect. People tend 
to make different choice of options that have the same value according to the frame 
of loss or gain of the options. When people perceive a frame of gain they tend to be 
risk adverse and choose the least risky option. When people perceive a frame of loss 
they tend to be risk inclined and choose the most risky option. The different answers 
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are explained by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The test was the 
following: 
 
Imagine that your University/Company has invested in a project that is a complete 
failure. There is the risk to lose 600.000 $.  
Two alternative projects A and B for one group and C and D for the other group are 
proposed aimed to reduce the losses. 
 
1 Group (context of gain) 
 
# if   project A will be chosen 200.000 $ will be recovered 
# if project B will be chosen  there is 1/3 of probability that 600.000 $ will be 
recovered and 2/3 of probability that nothing will be recovered. 
 
2 Group (context of loss) 
 
# if project C will be chosen 400.000 will be lost 
# if project D will be chosen there is 1/3 of probability that nothing will be lost and 
2/3 of probability that 600.000 will be lost. 
 
In this test the choice of A and C expresses  risk adversity whereas the choice of B 






Table 1. Results of the test on framing effect 
 
 Company University 
Programme A 
(positive frame-sure option 
1 2 
Programme B 
(positive frame-risky option) 
5 5 
Programme C 
(negative frame-sure option) 
1 1 
Programme D 





There are not great differences between academic and industrial participants. We also 
find no differences according the different technological domains. There is a risk 
seeking propensity that seems to neutralize the framing effect. There is the same risk 
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inclined answer  in the two different context of gain and loss. The explanation of this 
result that has no quantitative pretension is that also the academic participants  used 
to interact with the company and being involved in risky project had developed a 
business risk behaviour similar to the entrepreneurial participant.  
 5.3 to study the sunk cost phenomenon and the regret for financial losses we use a 




Imagine to be the president of a new  spin-off company. Thank to the contribution of 
some venture capitalists your company has invested 5 million $ in a research project 
for production system based on nanotechnology. When the project is completed 
another company begins the promotion of a similar production system. It is clear that 
the system of competitor is more efficient than your. Would you invest the remaining 




Imagine to be the president of a new spin-off company. One of your collaborator 
advised  you to invest the last 500.000 $ of your funds to build a new production 
system based on nanotechnology. You know that another company has began to 
promote a similar production system. It is clear that the system of  competitor is more 
efficient than yours. Would you invest the last 500.000 research fund to build the new 
system proposed by your collaborator?     
 
In this test the regret for the financial loss and the sunk cost effect is the choice of  
not to invest in the 1st scenario. The results are shown in the following table 2: 
 
Table 2. Results of the test on sunk costs fallacy 
 
 Company University 
1st Scenario-investing 5 4 
1st  Scenario-not investing - 2 
2nd Scenario-investing 1 - 
2nd Scenario-not investing 6 6 
 
 
The results show that when there is direct responsibility for the financial loss then 
there is regret for the possible loss, difficulty to accept it in front of you and the 
others, and therefore people choose to continue to finance the failed project. This 
phenomenon is present in both the academic and industrial participants. It expresses 




In conclusion we can suppose that there might be a distance between pure academic 
scientists and business oriented academic scientists. From one side the pure 
academicians, having no contact with the business world, can maintain a decision 
making style that reflects the operational norm of financial lightness and the social 
value of disinterest for economic gain. From the other side the business oriented 
academicians have absorbed the social norm of economic interest and the operational 
norm of financial heaviness present among industrial participants. Therefore they 
have more regret for losses and are more risk inclined. This hypothesis must be 
controlled empirically. 
 
5.4 The focus groups have analyzed the other topics without using  formal tests. Time 
perception and the operational norms loose time vs. pressing time differentiated 
business oriented academicians from entrepreneurial researchers. For the last ones 
time is pressing and it is important to find soon concrete results and not to waste 
money The answers show a clear temporal discounting. The charge of business 
participants to academicians was of looking too much ahead  and not caring about the 
practical need of  present. The different temporal perceptions were linked to the risk 
assessment. The need to obtain fast results to allow the survival of the company 
increased the risk perception of the money spent in the projects of R&D. On the 
contrary even if the academic participants were not pure but business oriented they 
didn’t show the temporal discounting phenomenon and the risk was perceived in 
connection with the scientific reputation inside the academic community (the social  
norm of universalism). For them what was risky was the failure of scientific 
recognition and not that of a business (vestiges of academic values). They also were 
inclined more to communitarism than exclusivity (vestiges of academic values). 
Knowledge should be open and public and not exclusive private property and 
monopole. For all participants  misunderstandings about time and risk are the main 
obstacles to the collaboration. University members accuse company members to be 
too short minded and prudent in the development of new ideas; entrepreneurial 
participants charge university members with being too far minded and advanced in 






The present paper was a hypothetical deductive  and analogical exercise to define 
potential  interesting topics for empirical studies about the cognitive styles of 
academic and industrial researchers. My current proposals are general but the 
empirical studies should be made according different variable as disciplinary and 
technological domains; size of University/company; geographical context. Since the 
goal of the studies is to single out the obstacles to the academy-industry 
collaboration, the subjects of the test should be articulated in at least four categories: 
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pure scientists, business oriented professor, academic entrepreneurs, and industrial 
researchers. In the case of technology transfer  also the category of TTO officers 
should be included. The next passage will be to articulate the test for each of the 
cognitive variables summarized in the table 5 and a questionnaire to control the 
presence of social values and operational norms. The tests and questionnaires will be 
submitted by email. Politecnico of Torino, Universita’ degli Studi of Torino, FIAT 
Research Centre and Telecom Research Centre  accepted to submit the tests (Viale, 
Pozzali, and Franzoni, inpreparation). Next step is to find a foreign University and 
company in a radical different context, like the American one, to compare the results. 
 
What can we expect to  infer from the results?  
If  the main hypotheses of this paper were confirmed we would know what are the 
main determinants of the cognitive dissonance. This knowledge would give us some 
clues on how to nudge (Thaler and Sustein, 2008) the main stakeholders of academy-
industry relation in order to improve the collaboration. For example if the results 
confirm the link between social values and operational norms with the cognitive style 
it might be difficult to overcome the distance between pure academic scientist and 
entrepreneurial researchers. What can be more affordable it is to strengthen   the 
emergence of  a dual career. Together with the pure academic researcher, university 
must promote a mestizo, a hybrid figure that as a two-faced Janus (Etzkowitz and 
Viale, 2009) is able to activate mentally two inconsistent set of values and 
operational norms, the academic and entrepreneurial ones. They would not believe 
them, but would accept them as if they believed (Cohen, 1992). They would be the 
cultural mediators and translators of the two world. They should be members of the 
same department of the pure scientists and would collaborate with them and with the 
industrial scientists. The reciprocal figure in the company is more difficult to 
introduce, except when the company is big and financially endowed. Two-faced 
Janus figure is different from that involved in TTO. The first  is a figure that should 
collaborate directly in research activity with corporate scientists whereas the second 
has the function to establish the bridge between academics and company. The first 
allows the research & development collaboration whereas the second the technology 
transfer.   
 Empirical confirmation of the emergence of this figures can be found in the 
trajectories of development of strongly science-based sectors such as biotechnologies, 
that has followed totally different path in America and Europe (Orsenigo, 2001). 
While the American system is characterized by a strong proximity between the 
industrial system and the world of research, with the universities in the first line in 
internalizing and in taking on many functions typical of the business world, in Europe 
the universities have been much more reluctant to take on a similar propulsive role. 
 
A second nudge suggestions that might come from the results of the study is the 
importance of face to face interaction and proximity between Universities and 
companies. The need of proximity has been underlined in recent studies (Arundel and 
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Geuna, 2004: for an explanation according the theory of complexity see Viale & 
Pozzali, forthcoming). Virtual cluster and meta district can’t play the same role in 
innovation. Proximity and face-to-face interactions are not only important to 
minimize the tacitness bottleneck in technology transfer. Face-to-face is fundamental 
for collaboration because of linguistic and pragmatic effect on understanding (see 
above). It also improves the rate of trust as it is proved by neuroeconomics (Camerer 
et al, 2005). Proximity can also increase the respective permeability to social values 
and operational norms. From this point of view Universities might promote the birth 
of open spaces of discussion and comparison where academicians and business 
members might develop a kind of learning by interacting. 
 
Finally a more theoretic result may be that of weakening the thesis of technological 
paradigm (Dosi, 1982). A technological paradigm are changes in technological 
systems that have a major influence on the behaviour of economics and are linked to 
Schumpeter’s idea of “creative gales of destruction”. The pervasivity of this change 
should affect  every component of the paradigm: knowledge, organization, 
production techniques, behaviours. Therefore every agent involved in the revolution 
should show a convergence towards similar values, norms, and way of thinking, 
reasoning, and deciding. As in the words of Kuhn “a paradigm is what  members of a 
scientific community, and they alone, share”. From this point of view the entire 
knowledge chain producers of a technological paradigm (ICT or Biotechnology), 
from pure scientists to entrepreneurial researchers should display a convergence in 
social values, operational norms and mainly cognitive styles. If this is not the case 
then the use of the concept of paradigm seems unjustified.   
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